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COMMENT 

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS: MEDICARE AND 

HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS' ANTI­

UNIONIZATION COSTS-TO REIMBURSE 

OR NOT TO REIMBURSE­
SECTION 107 OF TEFRA 

I. INTRODUCTION 
Employees ofHospital X wish to form a union in order to bargain 
collectively with their employer. Preferring to remain non-unionized, 
Hospital X seeks advice from Z, a consultingjirm specializing in man­
agement representation on labor issues. Firm Z agrees to represent 
Hospital X and attempts to dissuade the employees from choosing to 
unionize. During that year, Z bills the hospital over $49,000 for serv­
ices rendered Hospital X is then reimbursed in fullfor this cost by the 
medicare trust fund. 1 
In January, 1982, the Health Care Financing Administration 
(HCFA)2 of the United States Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS)3 announced that it would allow hospitals where em­
ployees were attempting to unionize to be reimbursed through medi­
care for costs incurred "in connection with union organizing 
1. Stanford Univ. Hosp. v. Blue Cross Assoc., [New Developments] MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) ~ 31,911, 9501 (PRRB Hearing Mar. 17, 1982), affd in relevant 
part, ~ 31,990, 9821 (HCFA Deputy Administrator Decision May 12, 1982). In Stanford 
University Hospital, the provider had incurred a "claimed cost of $49,432" for the serv­
ices of a management consulting firm to repel the unionization efforts of its employees. 
Stanford University Hospital, ~ 31,911 at 9503. These costs were allowed full medicare 
reimbursement, id at 9504, due to the reversal in federal policy under the Reagan ad­
ministration. See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text. 
2. The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) has been assigned by the 
United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) "the primary responsi­
bility for administering the Medicare program." U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVICES, HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 
ON MEDICARE COVERING FISCAL YEAR 1979, ii (1979) [hereinafter cited as REPORT]. 
3. HHS was formerly the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW); 
the redesignation occurred in 1979. Pub. L. No. 96-88, 93 Stat. 695 (codified at 20 U.S.c. 
§ 3508 (1982». 
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activities."4 Within eight months, Congress enacted the Tax Equity 
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA),5 a provision of 
which expressly repudiated this policy.6 Section 107 of TEFRA 
amended the medicare law7 to prohibit any such medicare payment 
to hospitals for "costs incurred for activities directly related to influ­
encing employees respecting unioniZation,"8 thus ending an ongoing 
dispute over the issue of reimbursement of these costs to health care 
providers.9 
This legislative-developments note examines the nature of that 
dispute as well as the chronology of administrative and congres­
sional events culminating in the enactment of section 107. Through 
a brief description of the medicare reimbursement scheme and an 
analysis of the relevant policy considerations, this note demonstrates 
that health care employer activities conducted to prevent employee 
unionization should not be subsidized by federally-funded social 
programs. In addition, the shifting of power in the decision-making 
process over health care cost control will be discussed. 10 
II. LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 
The issue of health care provider reimbursement arose in the 
4. Transmittal No. 261, § 2180.1 PROVo REIMB. MAN., Part I (Jan. 1982) reprinted 
in I MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) ~ 5999Z-55 (1983). See infra notes 43-49 
and accompanying text. 
5. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982). President Reagan signed the Tax Eq­
uity & Fiscal Responsibility Act into law on September 3, 1982. Id. 
6. Tax Equity & Fiscal Responsibility Act, 96 Stat. 337, section 107 (codified at 42 
U.S.C.A. § 1395x(v)(I)(N) (West Supp. 1975-1982». 
7. Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled, Title XVIII of the Social Security 
Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395vv (1976 & Supp. V 1981) and 42 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 1395-1395vv (West 1974 & Supps. 1975-1982, 1983). 
8. Tax Equity & Fiscal Responsibility Act, 96 Stat. 337, section 107 (to be codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(I)(N». 
9. "Provider" (of services) is a term of art defined in the medicare law as "a hospi­
tal, skilled nursing facility, comprehensive out patient rehabilitation facility, or home 
health agency ...." 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(u) (Supp. V 1981). The use of the term in this 
note encompasses the statutory definition. 
10. The scope of this note is limited to medicare cost reimbursement for counter­
unionization activities. Although provider reimbursement under the Medical Assistance 
Program (medicaid) presents a different statutory analysis, see 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396­
1396n (West 1974 & Supps. 1975-1982, 1983), the policy rationales supporting prohibi­
tion of medicare reimbursement of "management" consultant fees are equally applicable 
to the medicaid program. See Pressures in Today's Workplace: Hearings to Examine Em­
ployer Practices which May Infringe on Employee Rights D%re the Subcomm. on Labor­
Management Relations ofthe House Committee on Education and Labor, 96th Congo 1st 
Sess. 188-200,247-252 (1980) (Insertions: Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement claims 
by Massachusetts hospitals to cover costs of anti-union consulting services of Modem 
Management, Inc.) 
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context of a federal program designed to ensure the availability of 
adequate medical carel I to specified categories of personsl2 within 
the United States. \3 Congress enacted title XVIII of the Social Se­
curity Act,14 medicare, to provide a mechanism for national health 
insurance for the aged and disabled. IS The pfC'gram was intended to 
ensure needed health care through a government guarantee of pay­
ment of provider costs, a concept that surpassed mere reimburse­
ment based on the charge for a specific treatment. 16 
Prior to 1974, medicare reimbursement for providers' persua­
sion costsl7 was not an issue because employees of nonprofit health 
care institutions were exempted from coverage under the National 
II. In 1965, an estimated 40.2 percent of non-federal hospitals were unaccredited 
by the health-care industry'S standards. J. FEDER, MEDICARE: THE POLITICS OF FED­
ERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE 9 (1977). While many of these hospitals lacked adequate 
staff or were unclean and unsafe, the largest barrier to accreditation appeared to have 
been "their overall failure to measure up to contemporary standards of technology, staff­
ing, and medical practice." Id Most of these substandard facilities were small hospitals 
located in less populated, poor, and rural communities. Id 
12. There are three categories of persons entitled by statute to receive medicare 
coverage: 
(I) individuals who are age 65 or over and are eligible for retirement benefits 
under subchapter II of ... [the Social Security Act] or under the railroad re­
tirement system, (2) individuals under age 65 who have been entitled for not 
less than 24 months to benefits under subchapter II . . . or under the railroad 
retirement system on the basis of a disability, and (3) certain individuals who 
do not meet the conditions specified in either clause (I) or (2) but who are 
- medically determined to have end stage renal disease. 
42 U.S.C.A. § 1395c (West Supp. 1975-1982). 
13. S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 23, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 1943, 1964. Previous legislative efforts to ensure adequate medical care for 
the aged were found to be unsuccessful "because of the failure of some States to provide 
[medical] coverage and services to the extent anticipated." Id Congress thus established 
"a more comprehensive Federal program as to both persons who can qualify and protec­
tion afforded." Id 
14. Title XVIII of the Social Security Act (as added July 30, 1965), Health insur­
ance for the Aged and Disabled, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 291 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 1395-1395vv (West 1974 & Supps. 1975-1982, 1983». 
15. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (Supp. V 1982) which describes the hospital and 
related care insurance; S. REP., supra note 13, at 23 reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 1943, 1964. 
16. S. REP., supra note 13, at 23-24 reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 1964-65. Congressional intent was to "encourage participating institutions, agen­
cies, and individuals to make the best of modem medicine more readily available to the 
aged." Id at 24 reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1965. Implicit in the 
passage of medicare was the congressional consensus "that the elderly could not afford 
needed care." FEDER, supra note II, at II. Accordingly, Congress rejected explicitly a 
"needs" test for medicare. S. REp., supra note 131, at 23 reprinted in U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS, at 1964. 
17. The "cost of persuasion" is a term of art used in reference to any expenses 
incurred by a health care provider to resist employee unionization efforts. Throughout 
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Labor Relations Act (NLRA)18 and were therefore less likely to or­
ganize successfully for collective bargaining purposes. Congress 
amended the NLRA in 197419 to extend to those health care workers 
the protection that had already been accorded employees of nursing 
homes and proprietary hospitals.20 Because most non-government 
hospitals are classified as nonprofit institutions,21 the 1974 NLRA 
amendment greatly expanded the scope of federal protection of la­
bor union activities within the health care industry. Consequently, 
health care providers' expenses escalated in attempts to resist the in­
creased unionization efforts of their employees.22 
As medicare reimbursement principles are based upon the prov­
this note, it usually connotes the employment by a health care provider of management 
consultants for this purpose. 
18. For purposes of federal labor law coverage, the term "employer" previously 
was defined as: 
any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall 
not include the United States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or 
any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof, [or any 
corporation or association operating a hospital, if no part of the net earnings 
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual,] or any person 
subject to the Railway Labor Act. . . , as amended from time to time, or any 
labor organization (other than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in 
the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization. 
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 2(2), 61 Stat. 136 (1947) 
(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976». The 1974 amendment to the NLRA 
amended the definition by removing the section in brackets quoted above. 29 U.S.c. 
§ 152(2) (1976). The bracketed section was added specifically to remove non-profit hos­
pital employees from the NLRA's original definition of the term "employer". National 
Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 2(2), 49 Stat. 449, 450 (1935) amended 
by Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 2(2),61 Stat. 137 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.c. § 152(2) 
(1976». 
19. Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.c. 
§ 152(2) and § 152(14) (1976». 
20. The 1947 amendment did not exempt from NLRA jurisdiction employees of 
proprietary hospitals. See supra note 18. See also Butte Medical Properties, 168 
N.L.R.B. 266 (1967) (proprietary hospitals); University Nursing Home, Inc., 168 
N.L.R.B. 263 (1967) (proprietary nursing homes). In Drexel Home, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 
1045 (1970), the National Labor Relations Board established its jurisdiction over labor 
relations activities in nonprofit nursing homes. Id at 1047. Codifying this decision, the 
1974 NLRA amendment defined the term "health care institution" to encompass "any 
hospital, health maintenance organization, health clinic, nursing home, extended care 
facility or other institution devoted to the care of sick, infirm, or aged persons." 29 
U.S.c. § 152(14) (1976). 
21. Tax avoidance is the main reason for this status. See, e.g., HEALTH LAW 
CENTER, PROBLEMS IN HOSPITAL LAW 151-53 (1974). While federal and state hospitals 
are tax exempt due to statutory or constitutional provisions, other hospitals must fall 
within specific tax exempting provisions under federal or state law. Id at 151-52. 
22. American Hosp. Assoc. v. Harris, [New Developments] MEDICARE & MEDI­
CAID GUIDE (CCH) ~ 30,669, 10,731 (D.D.C. 1980). See infra notes 30-35 and accompa­
nying text. 
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iders' actual incurred costs,23 the federal government has had to de­
velop a policy regarding these types of expenses.24 No express 
position was announced initially by HHS, and it remains unclear 
whether the medicare fund at first was indemnifying hospital costs 
for opposing employee unionization.2s In June, 1979, HCFA finally 
enunciated a two-pronged policy that would control the disposition 
of funds to health care providers whose reimbursement requests in­
cluded such costS:26 first, reasonable management costs were 
reimburseable when "incurred to carry out the providers' obligations 
under a collective bargaining agreement"27 as these expenses were 
deemed to be directly related to the delivery of adequate health 
care;28 second, and conversely, management activities that involved 
persuading employees not to unionize were considered unrelated to 
actual health care and therefore costs attributable to such persuasion 
activities would not be reimbursed under the medicare program.29 
23. 	 See infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text. 
24. Generally, these expenses were for retaining law firms and management con­
sultants to assist the employer in repelling employee organization efforts. See, e.g., 
American Hosp. Assoc. v. Harris, [New Developments] Medicare & Medicaid Guide 
(CCH) ~ 30,669, 10,731, 10,732 (D.D.C. 1980). 
25. The American Hospital Association (AHA) alleged that "reimbursement for 
the expense of retaining lawyers, accountants, and consultants to advise providers of their 
rights and obligations during union organizing drives at health care facilities" had been 
authorized since the inception of medicare. Id [emphasis added]. This allegation makes 
no specific reference to direct persuasion activities costs. Conversely, HHS maintained 
that the 1979 revision to the Provider Reimbursement Manual, see infra text accompa­
nying notes 26-29, was the "traditional interpretation of the requirements contained in 
the statute and regulations." Notice of Policy Interpretation, 45 Fed. Reg. 69,561 (1980). 
Even though the revision was considered by HHS to be "a clarification of existing pol­
icy," fiscal intermediaries were advised to "reopen cost reports and make necessary ad­
justments to reflect this policy when they are aware of cases needing corrections ...." 
Transmittal No. 218, I MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) ~ 5,999Z-56 (1983). 
26. Notice of Policy Interpretation, 45 Fed. Reg. 69,561 (1980) (Prov. Reimb. Man­
ual § 2180); Transmittal No. 218, § 2180.2 PRov. REIMB. MAN., Part I (1979) reprinted in 
I MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) ~~ 5999Z-55 to 56 (1983). 
27. 	 45 Fed. Reg. 69,561 (1980) and I MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) ~ 
5999Z-56 (1979): The manual section states that: 
Reasonable expenses incurred by a provider for collective bargaining and re­
lated activities are allowable costs. Contract negotiations and any procedures 
which flow from enforcement of contract terms, whether in a collective or indi­
vidual setting, are necessary to maintain the continued operation of the pro­
vider and, thus, are a precondition for the delivery of health services. 
Id The manual provides the following example: ''The cost of the services of manage­
ment's representative in collective bargaining activities is an allowable cost." Id 
28. 	 Id 
29. 	 45 Fed. Reg. 69, 561 (1980). Section 2180.1 of the Provider Reimbursement 
Manual as Transmitted in 	1979 provides that: 
Costs incurred for activities directly related to influencing employees regarding 
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InAmerican Hospital Association v. Harris,3o the American Hos­
pital Association (AHA) challenged implementation of the rule, 
which was published as an addition to the Medicare Provider Reim­
bursement Manual, the government handbook of medicare reim­
bursement policies.31 Suing on its members behalf,32 the AHA 
raised both statutory33 and constitutional claims34 to void the new 
their right to organize or not to organize and to form a union or to join an 
existing union are not related to patient care and, therefore, are not allowable 
costs. Such costs are unallowable whether such activities are performed directly 
by the provider or through an independent contractor consultant or outside 
attorney. 
Id To clarify this position the manual presented the following example: "The costs ap­
plicable to a consultant who furnishes literature opposing union membership for pro­
vider employees or furnishes training to provider management to oppose employee 
membership in labor organizations are not allowable costs." Id 
30. [New Developments] MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) ~ 30,669, 10,731 
(D.D.C. 1980). The AHA is a nonprofit organization claiming a membership of approxi­
mately 6,200 health care institutions and 29,000 individuals. Id 
31. The Provider Reimbursement Manual is a collection of HHS interpretations 
and explanations of the medicare law and its regulations, utilized by HCFA, fiscal in­
termediaries and providers. 
32. Civil Action No. 80-1202 was filed in the United States District Court, District 
of Columbia. American Hosp. Assoc. v. Harris at 10,731. 
33. The AHA contended that the rule was adopted without notice or opportunity 
for interested parties to comment in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA), 5 U.S.c. §§ 552-53 (1982). American Hosp. Assoc. v. Harris at 10,732-33. 
Section 552(a)(I) as amended by the Freedom of Information Act requires that: 
Each agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal 
Register for the guidance of the public. . . 
(D) substantive rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by 
law, and statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability 
formulated and adopted by the agency; and 
(E) each amendment, revision, or repeal of the foregoing. Except to the 
extent that a person has actual and timely notice of the terms thereof, a person 
may not in any manner be required to resort to, or be adversely affected by, a 
matter required to be published in the Federal Register and not so 
published.... 
5 U.S.c. § 552(a)(I) (1982). Although section 4 of the APA (regarding rule making) is 
not applicable, through its language, to matters relating to federal "benefits" programs, 
id § 553(a)(2) (1982), the Secretary of the HEW had waived the agency's exemption 
from this section. 36 Fed. Reg. 2,532 (1971). See a/so Humana of South Carolina, Inc. v. 
Califano, 590 F.2d 1070, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1978). By waiver of this exemption, 5 U.S.c. 
§ 553(b) is applicable: 
General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal 
Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served 
or otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law. The notice 
shall include­
(I) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making pro­
ceedings; 
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and 
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of 
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policy. The AHA complaint survived the government's motion to 
dismiss for want of subject-matter jurisdiction,35 although a judicial 
decision on the merits was never reached because subsequent admin­
istrative action mooted the challenge. 
In a blatant attempt to purge the substance from AHA's pend­
ing claim, HCFA initiated notice and comment rulemaking proce­
dures.36 Shortly after the district court upheld its jurisdiction over 
AHA's claims,37 HCFA issued through the Federal Register a "No­
tice of Policy Interpretation" that reprinted and explained the 1979 
revision of the Reimbursement Manual regarding labor relations 
costS.38 At the conclusion of the comment period,39 HCFA nonethe­
less announced the retention of the two-tiered policy:40 Medicare 
payment for the cost of persuasion would continue to be disallowed, 
but actual collective bargaining costs would be reimbursable.41 The 
the subjects and issues involved. Except when notice or hearing is required by 
statute, this subsection does not apply­
(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules or agency 
organization, procedure, or practice; or 
(B) when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding 
and a brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice and 
public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the 
publi.c interest. 
5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982). Further, after the required notice is given, ''the agency shall 
give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submis­
sion of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presenta­
tion." Id § 553(c). 
34. AHA claimed that lack of notice and an opportunity to comment, as well as the 
proposed retroactive application of the rule, violated the fifth amendment's due process 
clause. American Hosp. Assoc. v. Harris, at 10,732-33. 
35. FED. R. CIY. P. 12(b)(1). The U.S. District Court's order based its subject mat­
ter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.c. § 1331 (1976) as federal questions were raised pursuant 
to 5 U.S.c. §§ 552-53 (1982) and the fifth amendment. American Hosp. Assoc. v. Harris 
at 10,735. While 5 U.S.c. § 702 of the APA did not provide an independent basis for 
federal court jurisdiction in this case, id , the AHA was not required to exhaust adminis­
trative remedies as the claim was brought "solely to vindicate procedural regularity." Id 
at 10,734. See also 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1976) and 42 U.S.C. § 139500 (1976 & Supp. V 
1981). 
36. See supra note 33; 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982). 
37. The order was entered on September 16, 1980. American Hosp. Assoc. v. Har­
ris at 10,735. 
3.8. 45 Fed. Reg. 69,561 (1980). The notice solicited "public comment on current 
HCF A policy with respect to Medicare reimbursement for provider costs incurred with 
respect to union activities." Id 
39. See Final Notice, 46 Fed. Reg. 3,983 (1981). 
40. Id at 3,984. 
41. Id The notice distinguished the two types of costs; 
Provider negotiations with provider employees with respect to wages, benefits 
and conditions of employment are clearly necessary to delivery of patient care 
whether conducted through individual or collective bargaining. The same is 
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HCFA expressed its intention to clarify this rule further,42 yet that 
communication was never forthcoming. Instead, HCFA, under the 
direction of President Reagan's appointees in HHS,43 reversed 
course with another revision of the Provider Reimbursement Man­
ual:44 "Reasonable costs incurred in furtherance of the rights and 
responsibilities of provider employers or employees under the . . . 
[NLRA are] allowable costs of operation. Provider facilities whose 
employees are not unionized may incur costs in connection with 
union organizing activities."45 While persuasion costs would be re­
imbursed under this standard, the revision disallowed any medicare 
payment of health care institutional costs incurred due to activities 
found to violate the NLRA.46 
Administrative convenience and consistency with national labor 
policy as expressed through the NLRA were the policy reasons ar­
ticulated to support reversal of a seemingly well-settled rule.47 To 
accomodate the medicare statutory requirements, HHS in essence 
defined "reasonable costs incurred in connection with union organiz­
ing activities" as provider expenses sufficiently related to patient care 
to warrant medicare funding.48 Additionally, the reversal was effec­
tive retroactively: Costs previously disallowed under the former 
1979 rule would be reconsidered and, if otherwise reasonable, would 
be reimbursed through medicare.49 
not true for activities designed to influence employees with respect to'whether 
or not to conduct their negotiations with the provider on an individual or a 
collective basis, sipce either basis can be and is used in the provision of patient 
care. 
Id 
42. Id at 3,985. 
43. In early 1981, Richard Schweiker, appointed by President Reagan, replaced 
Patricia Harris as Secretary of Health and Human Services. Two years later, Schweiker 
resigned the HHS post to accept a position as president of the American Council on Life 
Insurance, an insurance industry trade association. N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1983, at AI, col. 
3. 
44. Transmittal No. 261, supra note 4, ~ 5999Z-55. 
45. Id 
46. Id "Costs claimed for activities which are not authorized, or which are prohib­
ited by the NLRA will continue to be disallowed as unreasonable and unrelated to the 
efficient delivery of needed health services." Id 
47. Id 
48. Id Requiring reimbursable cost to be 'reasonable' supplements the other ex­
plicit statutory requirement that the cost in question must bear a sufficient relationship to 
treatment of medicare recipients. 42 V.S.C.A. § 1395x(v)(I)(A) (West Supp. 1975-1982). 
49. Transmittal No. 261, supra note 4, at ~ 5999Z-55. "Cost reports [should be 
reopened) where intermediaries had disallowed costs under Transmittal No. 218, dated 
June 1979, but which would be considered allowable and reasonable under this issu­
ance." Id 
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Predictably, labor unions protested vehemently the new reim­
bursement policy. Despite HHS pronouncements to the contrary,50 
organized labor viewed with alarm both the anti-union message con­
veyed by the executive branch of the federal government and the 
new policy's anticipated effect upon government neutrality in labor­
management matters.51 During a hearing of the House Labor Sub­
committee on Labor-Management Relations, organized labor's dis­
sent focused on its objection to the subsidization of anti-union 
activities with funds collected from working taxpayers. 52 In addi­
tion, House leaders urged the HHS Secretary to reinstate the former 
rule.53 HHS, however, failed to indicate that the policy would be 
reformed. 
Members of the House of Representatives then proposed an 
amendment to the medicare law designed to reverse the new policy 
favoring reimbursement of persuasion costs. 54 Meanwhile, the Sen­
ate Finance Committee considered measures to reduce the widening 
federal budget deficit.55 Consolidating its proposals, the Senate Fi­
nance Committee substituted its package for the text of H.R. 4961, a 
minor House-passed bill awaiting Senate consideration. 56 After the 
50. ,See, e.g., [Current reports] Gov'T. EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 958:20 (Apr. 12, 
1982). 
51. Id. at 958:21. 
52. Id Leaders of organized labor characterized the new reimbursement policy as 
"illegal and immoral" and a governmental legitimization of the practice of "union bust­
ing". Id 
53. Id 
54. See House Ways and Means Committee Print reprinted in 4 MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) ~ 24,513 (1982). The purpose of the proposal was to 
prohibit Medicare reimbursement for costs incurred for activities directly re­
lated to influencing employees respecting proposed unionization. Thus, costs 
incurred for activities related to infiuencing employees regarding their right to 
organize, to form a union, or to join a union would not be considered reason­
able. Such costs would not be allowable whether performed directly by the 
provider or through contracts with consultants or attorneys. 
Id 
55. The estimated federal budget deficits at the time of passage of the Act were 
$182 billion in fiscal year (FY) 1983, $216 billion in FY 1984, and $233 billion in RY 
1985. 128 CONGo REC. H6555 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1982) (statement of Rep. 
Rostenkowski). 
56. This procedure raises a question under the Constitution's revenue-raising origi­
nation clause which states that: "All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the 
House of Representatives; but the Senate may proposed or concur with Amendments as 
on other Bills." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. The constitutionality of bills that have 
originated in substance in the Senate has been upheld previously by the Supreme Court. 
In United States V. Norton, 91 U.S. 566 (1876), the Court encountered a challenge to 
an embezzlement indictment for violation of a federal revenue law that had been passed 
under similar circumstances to H.R. 4961. Holding that the "Act to establish a postal 
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full Senate approved the Finance Committee's recommendations, 
the essentially brand-new measure went directly to joint conference 
without a prior House vote as House Democrats attempted to avoid 
political fallout for enacting a tax increase in an election year.57 Al­
though the Senate Parliamentarian had ruled that the scope of the 
conference was limited solely to addressing the Senate-passed bill,58 
money-order system" was not a revenue bill in the constitutional sense, the Norlon Court 
stated that the meaning of revenue laws, for article I purposes, .. 'has been confined to 
bills to levy taxes in the strict sense of the words, and has not been understood to extend 
to bills for other purposes which [may) incidentally create revenue.''' Id at 569 (quoting 
2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 880, 6\0­
II (1858}). 
The Corporation Tax Law of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 61­
5, § 38, 36 Stat. 112 (1909), also originated as a Senate measure substituted for provisions 
in a House general revenue bill. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. \07, 142-43 (1911). 
Since "[t)he amendment was germane to the subject-matter of the [House) bill and not 
beyond the power of the Senate to propose," the Court decided that article I, section 7 
was not violated because the actual bill itself "properly originated in the House." Id at 
143. In Flint the Court professed great deference to the legislative process (at least on 
this particular constitutional issue): 
In thus deciding, we do not wish to be regarded as holding that the journals of 
the House and Senate may be examined to invalidate an act which has been 
passed and signed by the presiding officers of the House and Senate and ap­
proved by President and duly deposited with the State Department. 
Id 
When the issue identical to that in Flinl arose three years later, the Court held inler 
alia that a revenue raising bill "originating in the Senate and not in the HOlise of Repre­
sentatives" did not violate article I, section 7: The bill had been "proposed by the Senate 
as an amendment to a bill for raising revenue which [had) originated in the House." 
Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310, 317 (1914). The Rainey Court expressed doubt as 
to whether "there is judicial power after an act of Congress has been duly promulgated to 
inquire in which House it originated for the purpose of determining its validity. . . ." 
Id These cases indicate that the validity of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility 
Act, which evolved from an amendment to H.R. 4961, a House-passed revenue measure, 
could not be challenged successfully under article I's origination clause. In any event, 
the substantive changes made by the bill in health and income security programs are not 
revenue raising measures under the Norlon test and thus, could be severed from any 
'offending' part of the Act. Moreover, section 107 of the Tax Equity Act, like most of the 
medicare provisions did in fact originate in the House of Representatives. See supra note 
54 and accompanying text. 
57. See Tate, Legislalive Legend-Making, Tax Bill Style, 40 CONGo Q. 2043 (Aug. 
21, 1982). This fact did not go unnoticed by those House members in opposition to H.R. 
4961 in its final form: . 
Not only has the House of Representatives not had an opportunity to dis­
cuss, debate or amend provisions of this bill prior to action on this conference 
report, but the House committee of jurisdiction the Ways and Means Commit­
tee, has not even held hearings on most of the items contained within this 
proposal. 
128 CONGo REc. H6596 (dailyed. Aug. 19, 1982) (statement of Rep. Fields). 
58. Tate, supra note 57, at 2043. 
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other previous House-approved measures,59 including the anti­
unionization cost reimbursement ban, were incorporated within the 
final version of H.R. 4961.60 
H.R. 4961 thus became the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibil­
ity Act of 1982 and passed both houses of Congress on August 19, 
1982.61 A politically veto-proof measure,62 TEFRA was signed into 
law by President Reagan on September 3, 1982.63 Section 107 of 
TEFRA amended section 1861(v)(I) of the Social Security Act to 
provide that in determining reasonable costs for medicare reim­
bursement, "costs incurred for activities directly related to influenc­
ing employees respecting unionization may not be included." Thus, 
as a result of this congressional mandate, HHS is required to return 
to its former rule against reimbursement to health care providers for 
the costs of counter-unionization activities. 
III. MEDICARE COST REIMBURSEMENT PRINCIPLES 
Congressional legislation and regulatory schemes govern which 
costs will be allowable for reimbursement from medicare funds. 
HCFA, under HHS, is charged with responsibility for the execution 
of the national health care system. The core element of that respon­
sibility is the determination of what constitutes "reasonable costs", 
the issue most basic to the fiscal integrity of the medicare program. 
The essence of a functioning government-sponsored health care 
system is the determination of which costs of care will be met. That 
the program's policy objectives are manifested by the established re­
imbursement principles is axiomatic. With that understanding, Con­
gress enacted the Health Insurance for the Aged Act, also known as 
medicare.64 Medicare consists of two federal insurance programs 
that assist aged and disabled individuals with payment of health care 
59. See id. 
60. Estimated savings over a three year period from amendments to income main­
tenance and health programs were as follows: $13.3 billion, medicare; $1.1 billion, medi­
caid; and a combined $791 million in Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and unemployment compensation. H.R. 
REp. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 464, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
412,466. See also 128 CONGo REC. H6549, H6556 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1982) (statements 
of Representatives Ottinger and Rostenkowski). 
61. 128 CONGo REC. H6635-36 and S10945-46 (dailyed. Aug. 19, 1982). 
62. Anxious to reduce the widening gap between spending and the federal budget 
projections, the Reagan administration desperately needed a revenue-raising measure to 
exhibit some control over deficit spending. See supra note 55. 
63. E.g., 96 Stat. 324 (1982). 
64. See supra notes 7-16 and accompanying text. 
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bills: Part A, Hospital Insurance Benefits;6S and Part B, Supplemen­
tary Medical Insurance.66 
Part A "provides basic protection against the costs of hospital 
and related post-hospital and home health services."67 These bene­
fits cover specific statutorily defined services.68 Certain require­
ments, however, are placed upon the health care providers.69 
Medicare law also limits the reimbursement of the provider to its 
"reasonable costs" of rendering services to medicare recipients.7o 
Within the framework established by Congress, the Secretary of 
HHS promulgates regulations, defining more specifically which costs 
are deemed to be reasonable.7) The providers generally submit 
claims for reimbursement to private intermediaries who then deter­
mine the amount of reimbursement in accordance with the Depart­
ment's rules and regulations.72 Financed through a wage tax73 
similar to, but separate from, social security taxes, Part A's contribu­
tions have been segregated into the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust 
Fund.74 
65. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395c through 1395i-2 (West 1974 & Supps. 1975-1982, 1983). 
For eligibility requirements, see id § 1395c; Hospital Insurance Benefits, 42 C.F.R. 
§§ 405.101-.105 (1982). 
66. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395j-1395w (West 1974 & Supp. 1975-1982). For eligibility 
requirements, see id § 13950; Supplementary Medical Insurance Benefits, 42 C.F.R. 
§§ 405.201-.206 (1982). 
67. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395c (West Supp. 1975-1982). 
68. Id § 1395d. See iii. § 1395e for the law regarding deductibles and coinsurance. 
The regulations relevant to the scope of benefits under the medicare law are at 42 C.F.R. 
§§ 405.110-.133 (1982). 
69. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395f(a) (West 1974 & Supps. 1975-1982, 1983). The following 
regulations state the requirements to participate in the medicare program: For hospitals, 
42 C.F.R. §§ 405.1011-.1040 (1982); for skilled nursing facilities, id §§ 405.1101-.1137; 
for home health agencies, id §§ 405.1201-.1230; for clinics, rehabilitation agencies, and 
public health agencies, id §§ 405.1701-405.1726. RegUlations governing provider certifi­
cation and recertification include 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.1625-.1634 (1982). 
70. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395f(b) (West Supps. 1975-1982, 1983); 42 C.F.R. § 405.151 
(1982). By adopting a "reasonable cost" standard for reimbursement, Congress merely 
was following the then accepted practice of most health insurers. FEDER, supra note II, 
at 2, 53. This standard assures that hospitals generally would receive from medicare 
more than just the basic charge for providing a specific type of care. See supra note 16 
and accompanying text. 
71. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395x(v)(I)(A) (West Supp. 1975-1982). See infra notes 91-106 
and accompanying text. 
72. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395h (West 1974 & Supp. 1975-1982); see also REPORT, 
supra note 2, at 11. 
73. Ninety-one per cent of Part A hospital insurance is financed through this wage 
tax on employers, employees and the self-employed. REPORT, supra note 2, at ii and 9. 
General revenues and other sources provide funds for the remaining nine percent of Part 
A. Id at 9. 
74. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395i (West 1974 & Supps. 1975-1982, 1983). The "Board of 
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Part B, on the other hand, is a voluntary supplemental medical 
insurance program financed by premiums paid by its enrollees.75 Its 
coverage extends to a portion of the cost of physician care and other 
health items and services not within the statutory scope of Part A.76 
Administratively analogous to the hospital insurance,77 reimburse­
ment to providers for services rendered within the realm of Part B 
generally is determined by carriers under contract with HHS.78 
In both of these programs, the responsibility for determining the 
nature of patient care required rests primarily with the physician.79 
The underlying policy was not to have the federal government dic­
tate per se the specific treatment required for a patient. 80 Rather, 
Congress intended that the reimbursement of provider costs would 
furnish the governmental controls needed to ensure implementation 
Trustees of the Trust Fund" is responsible for "holding" the fund, reporting on its opera­
tion and status to Congress, and reviewing policies in the fund's management. Id 
§ 1395i(b). Ex officio members of the board include Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary 
of Labor, and Secretary of Health and Human Services. Id. The Treasury Secretary is 
designated the "Managing Trustee" while the Administrator of the Health Care Financ­
ing Administration serves as "Secretary of the Board". Id. Annual board reports made 
to Congress are to "be printed as a House [of Represenatives) document of the session of 
the Congress to which the report is made." Id. 
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1395j (1976); 42 C.F.R. § 405.201 (1982). See supra note 66 for 
eligibility requirements. 
76. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395k (West 1974 & Supp. 1975-1982); 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.230­
.239 (1982). 
77. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395n (West 1974 & Supp. 1975-1982, 1983). 
78. Id. § 1395u. See also REpORT, supra note 2, at II. 
Physicians generally are reimbursed on a "reasonable charge" basis for services ren­
dered to medicare recipients. For a detailed discussion of the distinguishing criteria for 
establishing reasonable costs to providers as compared to reasonable charges for physi­
cians, see 48 Fed. Reg. 8,902-35 (1983). 
79. Breeden v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 734 (D. La. 1974). In Breeden the court 
noted three principles to be considered in determining whether the medicare act em­
braces certain services rendered to a patient: (1) the totality of the patient's condition; 
(2) the great weight to be given a physician's opinion absent contrary evidence; and 
(3) the placing of responsibility on the attending physician for the choice of care re­
quired. Id. at 737. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1976) which prohibits federal interference in 
"the practice of medicine or the manner in which medical services are provided." Id. As 
a precondition to participation in the medicare program, however, providers are required 
to conform to state and local laws. 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.1020, 405.1120, 405.1220 (1982). 
Additionally, skilled nursing facilities and home health care agencies must comply "with 
all federal, state, and local laws relating to fire and safety, sanitation, communicable and 
reportable diseases, post-mortem procedures, and other relevant health and safety re­
quirements." Id. § 405.1120; see also id. § 405.1220. 
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1976). See also FEDER, supra note II, at 33-45 regarding the 
development of the "utilization review" principle. 42 U.S.c.A. § 1395x(k) (West 1974 & 
Supp. 1975-1982). Thus, use of provider facilities would be reviewed and evaluated by 
its own staff committee, not a federal review team, unless "it is impracticable for the 
institution" to form such a review team. Id. § 1395x(k). 
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of the program's overall goal, ensuring the availability of competent 
health care to the nation's aged or disabled.81 
While Congress has delegated broad authority to the Secretary 
of HHS to establish rules and regulations in determining which costs 
would be found reasonable,82 the statutory definition of the term 
"reasonable costs" provides certain criteria that must be considered 
by the administering agency.83 By congressional direction, the regu­
lations must 
take into account both direct and indirect costs of providers of 
services . . . in order that, under the methods of determining 
costs, the necessary costs of efficiently delivering covered services 
to individuals covered by the insurance programs established. . . 
[under medicare] will not be borne by individuals not so covered, 
and the costs with respect to individuals not so covered will not be 
borne by [medicare funds] ...84 
Additionally, in an effort to create an economic incentive to provider 
cooperation, Congre~s requires HHS to make "suitable retroactive 
corrective adjustments where, for a provider of services for any fiscal 
period, the aggregate reimbursement produced by the methods of 
determining costs proves to be either inadequate or excessive."8s 
This requirement allows issuance of timely payments, subject to ret­
roactive readjustments, to providers.86 
Section 107 of TEFRA serves as another direct Congressional 
limitation on the authority of the executive branch to define what 
constitutes a "reasonable cost".87 Despite the maxim that the ad­
81. See mpra notes 14-16 and accompanying text. 
82. Eg., Marina Mercy Hosp. v. Harris, 633 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1980). 
83. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395x(v)(I)(A) (West Supp. 1975-1982). 
84. Id. See also supra notes 95 and 99 and accompanying text. 
85. 42 U.S.c.A. § 1395x(v)(I)(A) (West Supp. 1975-1982). 
86. Under 42 C.F.R. § 405.405(a) (1982) the provider will receive "interim pay­
ments", usually at an estimated rate of its overall reimbursable costs. Id. Section 
405.405(c) (1982) provides that 
interim payments to providers will be made for services throughout the year, 
with final settlement on a retroactive basis at the end of the accounting period. 
Interim payments will be made as often as possible and in no event less fre­
quently than once a month. The retroactive payments will take fully into ac­
count the costs that were actually incurred and settle on an actual, rather than 
on an estimated basis. 
Id. 
87. Eg., Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center v. Richardson, 355 F. Supp. 965, 966 
(E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 486 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1973): Section 1395x(v) is sub­
ject to 42 U.S.C. § 1395e. Id. at 966. See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395x(v) (West 1974 & 
Supp. 1975-1982) for other examples of congressional "fine-tuning" of the definition of 
"reasonable costs." 
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ministering authority, with all its expertise, knows best how to imple­
ment congressional policy,88 section 107 obviously is consistent with 
the rule that agency determinations must bear a reasonable relation 
to the legislative purpose of the statute.89 A similar consideration is 
that regulations promulgated under medicare must be within the 
statutory authority delegated to the HHS Secretary by Congress.90 
88. E.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. I, 16 (1965). "When faced with a problem of 
statutory construction, this Court shows great deference to the interpretation given the 
statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration. . . When the construc­
tion of an administrative regulation rather than a statute is in issue, deference is even 
more clearly in order." Id at 16. Accord American Hosp. Management Corp. v. Harris, 
638 F.2d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding disallowance of reimbursement for rental 
payment costs to a "related organization"); Methodist Hosp. of Indiana, Inc. v. United 
States, 626 F.2d 823, 826 (Ct. CI. 1980) (affirming denial of reimbursement for "certain 
accrued pension plan costs"). 
Congress has the power to effectuate, within constitutional limits, any legislation to 
define its previous enactments. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
89. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965) in which the Court 
held that it was not an unfair labor practice under the NLRA for an employer to shut 
down its plant during an impasse solely to support its bargaining position. Id at 313. In 
rejecting the NLRB's position, the Court stated that "[t]he deference owed to an expert 
tribunal cannot be allowed to slip into a judicial inertia which results in the unauthorized 
assumption by an agency of major policy decisions properly made by Congress." Id at 
318. See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 390 U.s. 
261,272, mod!fied on reh'g, 392 U.S. 901 (1968) ("courts are the final authorities on issues 
of statutory construction"); see also Diplomat Lakewood, Inc. v. Harris, 613 F.2d 1009 
(D.c. Cir. 1979) in which the court invalidated as arbitrary, capricious and not in accord­
ance with law, regulations that required large independent nursing homes to use cost 
computation methods different from and arguably less accurate than those demanded of 
large hospitals and large hospital-nursing home complexes. Id at lOll. 
A "reasonable cost" regulation was challenged recently in American Hospital Man­
agement Corp. v. Harris, 638 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1981); the court found that the regula­
tion fulfilled the objectives of the relevant enabling legislation and, thus, was valid within 
the statutory framework. Id at 1213. The court enunciated its standard of review of 
such medicare regulations: 
Our review of the validity of that regulation is limited to determining whether 
the regulation is reasonably related to the purpose of the relevant enabling leg­
islation, as well as to the more particular purpose through which the regulation 
implements those objectives in a particular area. . . [T]he regulation. . . may 
not achieve its objective with mathematical precision. . . It is well established, 
however, that this . . . will not invalidate the regulation. 
Id at 1212. 
90. In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.), the Court 
restated the basic rule: "The legislative power of the United States is vested in Congress, 
and the exercise of quasi-legislative authority by governmental departments and agencies 
must be rooted in a grant of such power by the Congress and subject to limitations which 
that body imposes." Id at 302. See also Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977), in 
which the Court upheld an HEW regulation that allowed states to deny unemployment­
based AFDC to "persons disqualified under unemployment compensation laws ...." 
Id at 429. 
Constitutional attacks on the substance of regulatory provisions governing entitle­
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While mandating the reimbursement principles for provider 
costs91 of services rendered to medicare beneficiaries, the medicare 
regulatory scheme, binding on fiscal intermediaries,92 is designed to 
provide flexibility in most instances.93 Medicare reimbursement to 
providers is to be made for "[a]ll necessary and proper expenses of 
an institution in the production of services, including normal 
standby costs ...."94 The charges to the program are to be appor­
tioned, however, so that medicare pays "the share of the total institu­
tional cost that ... is related to the care furnished [medicare] 
beneficiaries. . . ."95 
The medicare regulations contemplate the accomplishment or 
use of six objectives or tests in the establishment of cost reimburse­
ment principles:96 (1) current payment to providers of services;97 
(2) full accounting of actual costs through retroactive adjustment;98 
ment programs have not fared well. Eg., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). A 
majority of the Burger Court has "been reluctant to impose affirmative governmental 
obligations to redress economic inequalities." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 1004 (1978). Consequently, challenges to public assistance regulations generally are 
based on statutory grounds, e.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199,232-33 (1974), or on fifth 
amendment procedural due process grounds, e.g., Himmler v. Califano, 611 F.2d 137 
(6th Cir. 1979). See also 5 U.S.c. § 706(2)(C) (1976) (scope of judicial review under the 
APA includes questions of statutory jurisdiction, authority, limitations, or right). 
91. 42 C.F.R. § 405.401(a), (b) (1982). 
92. Id § 405.401(c). 
93. Id § 405.401(d). This regulation provides that: 
In consideration of the wide variations in size and scope of services of providers 
and regional differences that exist, the [reimbursement) principles are flexible 
on many points. They offer certain alternatives and options designed to fit indi­
vidual circumstances and to allow time for those providers who do not already 
collect the statistical and financial data necessary for the reporting of costs to 
develop the necessary records. 
Id 
94. Id § 405.402(a). To ensure equity and fairness to providers, "payment is to be 
made on the basis of current costs of the individual provider, rather than costs of a past 
period or a fixed negotiated rate." Id. But see infra text accompanying notes 170-72. 
95. 42 C.F.R. § 405.402(a) (1982). In Good Luck Nursing Home, Inc. v. Harris, 
636 F.2d 572 (D.C. Cir. 1980), the court held that reimbursement was not available under 
medicare law "for legal and related expenses incurred unsuccessfully defending against 
an action for fraud arising out of ... [the provider's) participation in that program." Id 
at 575. The court noted further that the "statutory objective" for 42 U.S.c. 
§ 1395x(v)(l)(A) was "to ensure that the Medicare program bears the full and actual cost 
of providing care for its beneficiaries but none of the cost of providing health care to 
anyone else." Id. See also 42 C.F.R. § 405.403 (1982) (apportionment of allowable 
costs); id § 405.404 (methods of apportionment under medicare). 
96. 42 C.F.R. § 405.402(b) (1982). 
97. Id § 405.402(b)(I). This objective is designed to prevent the providers from 
"having to put up money for the purchase of goods and services well before they receive 
reimbursement." Id See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. 
98. 42 C.F.R. § 405.402(b)(2) (1982). The adjustment is designed to account fully 
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(3) allocation of costs between medicare beneficiaries and other pa­
tients;99 (4) flexibility in reimbursement methods; 100 (5) equitable 
treatment regardless of provider's proprietary status; 101 and (6) ne­
cessity for provider's growth and adjustment for technological ad­
vancement. 102 Ultimately, the issue of reimbursement is dependent 
upon a determination that a particular cost is related to the care of 
medicare patients and that the cost is "necessary and proper". 103 Al­
though the federal government relies on private carriers, especially 
in the supplementary insurance program,l04 to assist directly in the 
administration of medicare, these carrier-intermediaries nevertheless 
are bound to follow the rules and regulations as prescribed by 
HHS.105 Reasonable cost criteria as defined by statute and regula­
tion are the guiding principles to all parties involved in the financial 
administration of medicare. 106 
IV. To REIMBURSE OR NOT TO REIMBURSE: POLICY 

CONSIDERATIONS 

Underlying any HHS rule of medicare reimbursement for 
health care provider costs is a policy-laden rationale based primarily 
on furthering the program's ultimate goals. The unionization cost 
question, however, also requires consideration of national labor pol­
icy. During the period of policy formulation of the unionization -cost 
issue, many factors were weighed in HHS's original decision not to 
for "increases in cost ... as they actually occurred, not just prospectively." Id. See 
supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. 
99. 42 C.F.R. § 405.402(b)(3) (1982). See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
See also Board of Regents v. Califano, 586 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1978) for a clear explana­
tion of the theory behind and operation of the cost apportionment principle. 
100. 42 C.F.R. § 405.402(b)(4) (1982). See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
101. 42 C.F.R. § 405.402(b)(5) (1982). 
102. Id. § 405.402(b)(6). 
103. Id. § 405.451(a). This regulation provides in part: 
All payments to providers of services must be based on the reasonable cost of 
services covered under title XVIII ofthe [Social Security] Act and related to the 
care of beneficiaries. Reasonable cost includes all necessary and proper costs 
incurred in rendering the services, subject to principles relating to specific items 
of revenue and cost. 
Id. 
104. See id. §§ 405.501 and 405.502(d) (1982). 
105. Id. § 405.401. 
106. See supra text accompanying notes 82-86. Reimbursement for Part B covered 
services, particularly when the provider is a "non-participant" in the medicare program, 
is made on the basis of a "reasonable charge" standard. 42 C.F.R. § 405.501 (1982). The 
payment may be made directly to the individual beneficiary, id. § 405.25 I (a), or rather to 
the "person who furnished the services." Id. § 405.25 I (b). The regulations contain the 
criteria for determining "reasonable charges". Id. § 405.502. 
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reimburse a hospital's anti-unionization costS.107 Relevant also to 
section 107 of TEFRA, these factors appropriately may be examined 
in light of that provision's ban on medicare reimbursement for 
health care providers' unionization costs. 
A. Consistency with Existing Federal Law and Policy 
The initial HHS decision not to reimburse providers' counter­
unionization costs reflected the basic legislative premise underlying 
the medicare program: Medicare funds are available only for the 
costs of delivering health care to recipients. lOS Because the provid­
ers' preference to employ unorganized workers is unrelated to the 
purpose of medicare, the original 1979 HHS pronouncement was en­
tirely consistent with the statutory scheme established by Congress. 
The January, 1982, decision to overturn that pronouncement 
was based on assuring some congruity in national policy; if the pro­
vider conduct surrounding unionization activities was not censurable 
under federal labor law, such provider activity should not be dis­
couraged through the federal medicare reimbursement scheme.109 
Reagan administration officials contended that the inconsistency 
caused by a policy of nonallowance was indicative of bureaucratic 
overregulation beyond legitimate legislative goals. 110 Yet, while the 
NLRAIII represents a congressional expression of national labor 
policy,II2 medicare reimbursement is an unrelated mechanism 
designed to further national health care objectives. Legislation can 
be legitimately enacted in different, but intersecting, spheres of influ­
ence. Aware of the consequences of its law-making power, Congress 
can ensure that, in appropriate situations, proposed legislation will 
mesh with established laws in these overlapping areas. Such was not 
the case here, however, as the passage of the medicare act in 1965 
107. See 46 Fed. Reg. 3,983 (1981); see .supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text. 
108. See .supra notes 95, 99 and accompanying text. 
109. See .supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
110. Id 
111. 29 V.S.c. §§ 151-69 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
112. Some commentators have suggested that the original version of the NLRA, 
Pub. L. No. 74-198,49 Stat. 449 (1935), "was enacted largely because of the failure of 
American employers to modernize their concepts of industrial relations by giving em­
ployees an opportunity to participate in the determination of wages, hours, and working 
conditions." G. BLOOM & H. NORTHRUP, ECONOMICS OF LABOR RELATIONS 592 (1977). 
In effect the original version of the NLRA "put the power of the federal government 
behind the union organizer, assuring him that employees could choose whether or not to 
join a union without fear of employer interference." Id at 593. The Labor Management 
Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136, amended the 1935 act and shifted 
the balance of power back to the employer. Id at 600-01, 629. 
433 1983] LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS 
occurred before most health care workers were recognized as within 
the protection of the NLRA.113 
Control over the decision-making process in these overlapping 
areas, however, could pose administrative problems. Medicare is ad­
ministered by HCFA, a specialized agency of HHS.114 An intertwin­
ing of the functions of the National Labor Relations Board with 
HCFA would be administratively unfeasible as well as undesirable 
in effect for both labor and management. Complex national policy 
objectives for health care and labor relations are not promoted by 
extending the jurisdiction of already specialized bureaucracies into 
unrelated areas of national importance. This difficulty would be evi­
dent when an NLRA-violating employer, cited by" the NLRB, exer­
cises its legal options of appeal in order to delay or negate the 
unfavorable disposition of its reimbursement requests. I IS Notwith­
standing the double jurisdiction problem, the time lapse issue could 
be ameliorated by an agency rule that automatically denies medicare 
reimbursement for costs arising from activities found by the NLRB 
as violative of federal labor law. HHS, however, established no such 
trigger when the policy allowing unionization costs was adopted. Al­
though violation of the NLRA was a benchmark of the outer limits 
for allowance of labor relations costs,116 no serious enforcement 
mechanism was designed for screening providers' claims relating to 
counter-unionization activities. Another problem arises when the 
question involves state, county or municipal hospitals, as such insti­
tutions ordinarily are subject only to state labor laws, not to the 
NLRA.117 Under the Reagan administration rule, those hospitals 
would never be denied reimbursement for anti-unionization costs as 
the providers could not be held in violation of the NLRA.118 
Another apparent inconsistency with a rule of nonreimburse­
ment arises due to the Internal Revenue Code's1l9 treatment of an 
employer's persuasion costs. Under federal income tax law, an em­
ployer may deduct from its gross income business-related manage­
ment and labor consultant fees if they are both "ordinary and 
113. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text. 
114. See supra note 2. 
115. This delay would frustrate the medicare objective of ensuring current pay­
ment to health care providers. See supra note 97. 
116. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
117. See, e.g., Camden-Clark Memorial Hospital, 221 N.L.R.B. 945 (1975) (non­
profit hospital found to be a political subdivision of the state is exempt from NLRA 
jurisdiction). 
118. See supra notes 46 and accompanying text. 
119. I.R.C. §§ 1-9602 (West 1974 & Supp. 1983). 
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necessary" in the statutory sense. 120 Previously, HCFA had dis­
missed this conflict with a "separate spheres" argument by explain­
ing that "[t]he Internal Revenue Code differs in nature and purpose 
from the Medicare law. Treatment of costs unrelated to patient care 
under the Code is irrelevant to the allow ability of such costs under 
the Medicare law."121 Thus, medicare policy and federal tax law are 
other areas in which national policy implementation intersects but 
does not necessarily mesh. 122 The Internal Revenue Service's posi­
tion is erroneous. Costs of persuasion, which reflect merely the em­
ployer's preference to employ unorganized workers, are not 
"necessary" to the conduct of business. This preference falls outside 
of the business-judgment doctrine 123 and persuasion expenses should 
therefore be held nondeductible. 124 Tax policy notwithstanding, the 
emphasis under medicare reimbursement focuses on concerns dis­
similar from those measures designed to raise federal revenue by 
taxing enterprises that operate in the private sector. 
Prior to January, 1982, comparisons to other statutory schemes 
were not successful in convincing HHS officials to permit medicare 
reimbursement of health care employers' costs to contest employee 
organizing efforts. The attempted synchronization with the NLRA 
was doomed from the outset due to both administrative difficulties 
and the exclusion from NLRA coverage of many affected providers 
operated by local governmental units. While the implementation of 
section lO7 will not alleviate certain inconsistencies in federal law 
related to this issue, it will be fundamentally egalitarian in effect as it 
applies with equal force to all health care providers participating in 
the medicare program. 
120. I.R.C. § 162(a) (West 1974 & Supp. 1983) provides that: "There shall be al­
lowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the 
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business." Id. See 46 Fed. Reg. 3,985 (1982). 
121. 46 Fed. Reg. 3,985 (1982). 
122. See supra text accompanying notes 110-13. 
123. The "business-judgment" rule allows deductions for reasonable business ex­
penses if a reasonable person in that business would have incurred such an expense; in 
other words, a court would not "second guess" a business person's judgment. Contra 
Friedman v. Delaney, 171 F.2d 269 (1st Cir. 1948). 
Sound public policy reasons exist for disallowing employer tax deductions for the 
cost of persuasion. The Internal Revenue Service, however, has interpreted I.R.C. 
§§ 162(c), (f), and (g) as covering the field of non-deductibles based on policy concerns. 
26 C.F.R. § 1.162-1(a) (1982). 
124. Ironically section 107 was passed as part of the package in the Tax Equity & 
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324, 337 (1982). Perhaps 
Congress also should have examined the Internal Revenue Service's treatment of em­
ployers' persuasion costs. 
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B. 	 Distinguishing Reimbursable from Non-Allowable Costs of 
Labor-Relations Activities 
When HHS revised the rule in January, 1982 to allow costs, the 
agency contended that it had become administratively impracticable 
to distinguish costs of persuasion from certain other allowable costs. 
Because "reasonable costs" included the 'informing' of employees 
and obtaining outside consultants "to familiarize supervisors and 
employees with labor law," analysis of provider motivation was the 
alleged obstacle to "allocat[ing] costs between those attributable to 
'persuasion' and those attributable to 'information'."125 Employers, 
nevertheless, are already obligated to provide this information to the 
United States Department of Labor (DOL) pursuant to the Labor­
Management Reporting & Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA).126 
In addition to setting out a "Bill of Rights for Members of La­
bor Organizations",127 the LMRDA requires employer reports on 
both activities conducted and expenditures made to resist employee 
unionization.128 Under the LMRDA, the employer is required to in­
form the DOL regarding any arrangement with or payment made to 
125. 	 Transmittal No. 261, supra note 4. 
126. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 522 (1959) (codified at 29 U.S.c. §§ 401-531 (1976 
& Supp. V 1981)). The preamble to the LMRDA (also known as the Landrum-Griffin 
Act) reaffirms the employees' right to organize for collective bargaining purposes: "The 
Congress finds that, in the public interest, it continues to be the responsibility of the 
Federal Government to protect employees' right to organize, choose their own represent­
atives, bargain collectively, and otherwise engage in concerted activities for their mutual 
aid or protection." 29 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1976). 
127. 	 29 U.S.c. § 411 (1976). 
128. Id § 433(a)(3) (1976). Reports must be filed by an employer who makes 
any expenditure, during the fiscal year, where an object thereof, directly or indi­
rectly, is to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the 
right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, or is to obtain information concerning the activities of employees or a 
labor organization in connection with a labor dispute involving such employer, 
except for use solely in conjunction with an administrative or arbitral proceed­
ing or a criminal or civil proceeding. . . . 
Id The subsection's language apparently contemplates that the employer must violate 
section 8(a)(I) of the NLRA which declares it illegal for an employer "to interfere with, 
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights [to organize and to bargain 
collectively] guaranteed in section 7." 29 U.S.c.A. § 158(a)(I) (West 1974 & Supp. 1983). 
Congressional intent, however, was to require "[tlull reporting and public disclosures by 
employers of expenditures for the purpose of persuading employees to exercise, not to 
exercise, or as to the manner of exercising their rights to organize and bargain collec­
tively ..." SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PuBLIC WELFARE, LABOR-MANAGEMENT 
REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3, 
reprintedin 1959 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2318, 2319. For an excellent synthesis 
of the legiSlative history and purpose behind LMRDA's persuasion-related reporting re­
quirement, see Donovan V. Master Printers Ass'n, 532 F. Supp. 1140, 1141-44 (N.D. Ill. 
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an independent consultant129 whose function is to dissuade employ­
ees from exercising their right to unionize.130 The consultant must 
also report the nature of its arrangement with the employer. \31 By 
statutory mandate, then, health care employers are obligated to state 
in detail these anti-unionization activities. \32 
1981), aJl'd, 699 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1983), cerl. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3509 (U.S. Jan. 10, 
1984) (No. 83-599). 
129. LMRDA defines a "labor relations consultant" as "any person who, for com­
pensation, advises or represents an employer, employer organization, or labor organiza­
tion concerning employee organizing, concerted activities, or collective bargaining 
activities." 29 U.S.C. § 402(m) (1976). The Act broadly defines the term "person" as 
"one or more individuals, labor organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations, 
legal representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated 
organizations, trustees, in cases under Title 11, or receivers." 29 U.S.C.A. § 402(d) (West 
Supp. 1974-1982). 
130. 29 U.S.c. § 433(a)(4) and (5) (1976). An employer is required to file a report 
when in a fiscal year there is an "agreement or arrangement" between it and a consultant 
who then "undertakes activities where an object thereof, directly or indirectly, is to per­
suade employees . . . as to the manner of exercising the right to organize and bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own choosing ...." Id. § 433(a)(4). Fur­
ther, a report must be filed when "any payment (including reimbursed expenses) pursu­
ant to [such] ... an arrangement" is made. Id. § 433(a)(5). See generally Annot., 3 
A.L.R. FED. 770 (1970). 
131. 29 U.S.c. § 433(b) (1976). The congressional intent of this subsection was to 
require the filing of 
[f)ull reports by any person who has an agreement with an employer to per­
suade employees to exercise or not to exercise or as to the manner of their exer­
cising their rights to organize and bargain collectively; or who supplies 
information to an employer concerning the activities of employees or labor or­
ganizations in connection with a labor dispute. 
S. REP. No. 187, supra note 128, at 3, reprinled in 1959 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
2319. 
While LMRDA exempts from its disclosure requirements "any information which 
was lawfully communicated to such attorney by any of his clients in the course of a 
legitimate attorney-client relationship," 29 U.S.c. § 434 (1976), attorney persuaders 
nonetheless are not exempt from a required § 433(b) filing. Wirtz V. Fowler, 372 F.2d 
315, 324 (5th Cir. 1966). See also supra note 129. 
In Douglas V. Wirtz, 353 F.2d 30 (4th Cir. 1965), cerl. denied, 383 U.S. 909 (1966), 
the court held that pursuant to section 433 of the LMRDA an employer's attorney must 
also report 
all income and expenditures in connection with labor relations advice and serv­
ices, given or rendered aside from the persuasion activities, if the attorney has 
within the same reporting period also either acted or received payment . . . 
under § (b)(l). Consistently, he would not be required to report fees and ex­
penses for independent advice if there has been neither a persuasion service 
performed, nor payment for a previous service received, in that year. 
Id. at 32. Accord Price V. Wirtz, 412 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1969) (rejecting its earlier posi­
tion taken in Fowler specifically to follow Douglas). See Annot. 3 A.L.R. FED. at 780-86. 
132. 29 U.S.c. § 439(d) (1976): "Each individual required to sign reports under 
sections 431 and 433 of this title shall be personally responsible for the filing of such 
reports and for any statement contained therein which he knows to be false." Id. Wilful 
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In view of the DOL reporting requirements, it may therefore be 
asserted that the monitoring of medicare reimbursement for provider 
costs in these matters should not raise administrative barriers as 
duplicates of the reports filed with the DOLi33 could be prima facie 
evidence of provider intent regarding persuasion expenditures. This 
assertion, while appealing at first glance, does not withstand analy­
sis. Although the statutory scheme of the LMRDA lends itself to 
assisting in the determination of allowable costs in close cases, the 
current DOL interpretation of the employer reporting provision of 
the LMRDAI34 prevents adequate monitoring of provider costs be­
cause it assures the secrecy of management-consultant activities. 135 
Contradicting the original Congressional intent,136 this administra­
tive interpretation requires employer advisors or consultants in 
unionization drives to report to DOL only when these third-parties 
are in direct contact with the employees.137 As most counter-unioni­
violations, false statements or representations of a material fact, and failure to disclose or 
the making of a false entry will subject the violator to a fine of "not more than $10,000" 
or imprisonment "for not more than one year, or both." Id §§ 439(a),(b),(c). The em­
ployer reporting provisions, however, do not imply a private right of action that unions 
can bring against employers or employer-agents; only the Secretary of Labor can enforce 
its provisions. International Union, UAW v. National Right to Work Legal Defense and 
Education' Foundation, Inc., 590 F.2d 1139, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
133. Employer and 'persuader' reports filed pursuant to the LMRDA are public 
information, available upon request for inspection and examination. 29 U.S.C. § 435(a), 
(b) (1976). 
134. 29 U.S.c. § 433 (1976). 
135. AFL-CIO News, Dec. 25, 1982, at 2, col. 4. 
136. The purpose of section 203 of the LMRDA was to require employer reporting 
"of all agreements with independent contractors" involving counter-unionization efforts 
regardless of the specific role played by the management consultant in those efforts. 
Conference Rep. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 2503, 2504. Recognizing that "large sums of money are spent in organized 
campaigns on behalf of some employers for the purpose of interfering with the right of 
employees to join or not to join a labor organization of their choice," Congress contem­
plated that employers would be required to report their arrangements with in­
termediaries hired to combat employee organization. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 10 reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2318, 2327. Mandated disclo­
sure of such behind-the-scene arrangements was a desireable policy "for if the public has 
an interest in preserving the rights of employees then it has a concomitant obligation to 
ensure the free exercise of them." Id at II, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONGo AD. 
NEWS 2327. 
As recently stated by a district court judge: "The record is replete with evidence that 
Congress believed that 'union busting' management middlemen were working with em­
ployers to undermine employees in their attempt to exercise their § 7 [of the NLRA] 
rights." Donovan V. Master Printers Ass'n, 532 F. Supp. 1140, 1149 (N.D. m. 1981), 
affd, 699 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3509 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1984) 
(No. 83-559). 
137. AFL-CIO News, Dec. 25, 1982, at 2, col. 4. But see 29 C.F.R. § 406 (1982) 
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zation practices and activities directed by these management consul­
tants are implemented through the employer's supervisory staff,138 
an extensive anti-union campaign can be waged while the real pro­
tagonist, the consultant, is thoroughly insulated from LMRDA re­
quirements. Thus, without DOL interpretation and enforcement in 
accordance with Congressional intent, the LMRDA realistically 
could not provide the HCFA with the information needed to deter­
mine which costs are reimbursable under law. 
The implementation of any verification process will nonetheless 
be facilitated greatly by a recent amendment to the medicare law. 139 
This addition provides that authorized representatives of HHS or the 
Comptroller General must be allowed access to contracts for services 
and to books, documents and records of those services if the contract 
is between a provider and a subcontractor. 14o In essence, the deter­
mining agent could examine the records of the labor relations con­
sultant to discern more readily which costs would be allowed as 
"necessary" to patient care. 141 
To summarize, ultimate responsibility for allowance of cost re­
imbursement rests with the HCFA, an agency possessing the exper­
tise to handle difficult questions of fact regarding which 
and Donovan v. Master Printers Ass'n, 532 F. Supp. 1140, qffd, 699 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 
1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3509 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1984) (No. 83-599). 
The Secretary reads § 203(b) to require the reporting of receipts' and dis­
bursements for all clients who received any labor relations advice if a labor 
consultant engages in any persuader activity. Thus, the Secretary treats the ren­
dering of persuader services as a trigger which compels full disclosure of infor­
mation otherwise non-reportable under § 203(c). 
Donovan v. Master Printers Ass'n, 532 F. Supp. at 1144, qffd, 699 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 
1983), cerl. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3509 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1984) (No. 83-559). 
138. AFL-CIO News, Dec. 25, 1982, at 2, col. 4. 
139. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 952,94 Stat. 2646 
(1980) (codified at 42 U.S.c. § 1395x(v)(I)(I) (Supp. V 1981). 
140. Id. See Proposed Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. 44,750, 44,755 (1982) and Final Rule, 47 
Fed. Reg. 58,260, 58,267 (1982) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 420.300-420.304). 
If a contract between a provider and a subcontractor covers services valued at 
or costing $10,000 or more over a 12-month period, Medicare reimbursement 
cannot be made for the services unless the contract included a clause allowing 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Comptroller General and 
[sic] access to the contract and to the subcontractor's books, documents and 
records necessary to verify the costs of the contract. The clause in the contract 
must also permit similar access to any subcontract between the subcontractor 
and a related organization of the subcontractor when the subcontract is worth 
or costs $10,000 or more over a 12-month period. 
47 Fed. Reg. 44,750. 
141. See 42 C.F.R. § 420.304 (198--) for procedure to be taken to obtain access to 
subcontractor records. 
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management-type costs will be reimbursed by the medicare trust 
funds. Even without official DOL assistance in difficult cases, it is 
unlikely that HCFA would become overburdened by providing the 
type of analysis needed to decide the issue of allowability. Adminis­
trative inconvenience is not a factor because the recent addition to 
the law virtually assures the HCFA access to the business records of 
parties in contract with health care providers. 
C. Provider Unionization Costs Are Not Related to Patient Care 
Some health care institutions have insisted that the costs of per­
suasion actually are related to patient care, advancing the theory that 
full information about unions from the employer to its employees is 
essential to "maintain a smooth functioning environment" in the 
hospital. 142 Using the tests or objectives promulgated within the fed­
eral regulations,143 the HCFA has made a reasonable distinction to 
rebut this contention: 
Provider negotiations with provider employees with respect to 
wages, benefits and conditions of employment are clearly neces­
sary to delivery of patient care whether conducted through indi­
vidual or collective bargaining. The same is not true for activities 
designed to influence employees with respect to whether or not to 
conduct their negotiations with the provider on an individual or a 
collective basis, since either basis can be and is used in the provi­
sion of patient care. 144 
Thus, collective bargaining costs, because they are essential to the 
operation of the institution, are allowable; persuasion costs, however, 
are not in any sense necessary to the health care function and are not 
reimbursable. With the enactment of section 107, HHS is expected 
to reaffirm the reasoning behind the two-tiered approach, initially 
articulated in 1979.145 Section lO7's "directly related" activities re­
quirement, however, may open the door to allowing costs for activi­
ties that incidentally influence employees regarding the decision to 
unionize. 146 An interpretation of section 107 that would disallow all 
labor relations costs save those necessary to implement a collective 
bargaining agreement would therefore be consistent with congres­
sional intent and administratively nonburdensome. 
142. 46 Fed. Reg. 3,983, 3,984 (1981). 
143. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text. 
144. 46 Fed. Reg. 3,983, 3,984 (1981). 
145. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29. 
146. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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D. Government Neutrality in Labor-Management Affairs 
A cornerstone of national labor policy has been to maintain the 
federal government's neutrality in private sector labor-management 
relations. 147 Hospitals unsurprisingly protested that failure to re­
ceive reimbursement for persuasion costs was a clear signal from the 
government disfavoring their position against collective bargain­
ing. 148 To do otherwise, however, would place the financial re­
sources of the medicare trust fund behind an employer wishing to 
mount an anti-union campaign; such government action would be 
inconsistent with the spirit and purpose of the medicare act. 149 
Clearly, the neutrality doctrine is razed by federal funding of em­
ployer anti-union activities. 
Regardless of the employer's statutory obligation to bargain in 
good faith,'50 even reimbursement of collective bargaining costs 
could have a detrimental effect on the good faith principle. Because 
expenses for collective bargaining negotiations are allowable as costs 
related to patient care, the hospital, as the employer, has federal 
financial assistance that "may have the effect of encouraging em­
ployers to prolong union negotiations which, in tum, may force em­
ployees and their trade associations into arbitration which can be 
costly and time consuming."151 HCFA, perhaps naively, has indi­
cated its confidence in the health care institutions to be "concerned 
with providing quality care" and not to "jeopardize patient care by 
unnecessarily prolonging labor disputes with employees."'52 Both 
the neutrality doctrine and the legislative purpose of medicare are 
147. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 401 (1976). See supra note 112. 
148. 	 See 46 Fed. Reg. 3,983, 3,984 (1981). HCFA responded to this charge: 
It is not our intent, nor do we have the authority, to interfere with a pro­
vider's operating and management decisions. In promulgating this policy, we 
do not intend to deny or diminish the rights of provider management to foster 
employer-employee relationships that mayor may not be pro-union. Our pol­
icy is intended to insure that only costs related to patient care are reimbursed 
under the Medicare program. 
Id at 3,984-85. 
149. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text. 
150. Section 8(d) of the NLRA (29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976» in essence defines the 
good faith principle as 
the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representa­
tive of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. . . but 
such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. . . . 
Id 
151. 46 Fed. Reg. 3,983, 3,985 (1981). 
152. Id 
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best served, therefore, by a policy of non-reimbursement whenever 
labor-management conflict is the source of provider costs. 
E. 	 Legislative Purpose: Cost Effectiveness Questions and Control of 
Health Care Costs 
The legislative policy behind the "reasonable cost" principle is 
the rational allocation of trust fund monies to advance health care 
for the aged and disabled. 153 Recognizing this policy, hospitals have 
contended that anti-unionization expenses would be cost effective if 
the institution is successful in preventing employee collective bar­
gaining. 154 This contention rests on the legitimate assumption that 
employees who bargain on an individual basis are less effective than 
those who negotiate through a union. 155 Over the short run, hospital 
employers, willing to expend substantial amounts for counter-union­
ization efforts, may undoubtedly grant higher wages or benefits to 
deter employees from unionizing. Nonetheless, under the regula­
tions, providers are expected to pay salaries at rates not in gross ex­
cess of the prevailing wage scales. 156 Criteria set forth in the 
regulations ensure that, unionized or not, a hospital will receive 
medicare reimbursement for no more than the reasonable costs for 
expenses found to be necessary and proper. 157 Viewed from this per­
spective, the cost effectiveness theory appears based on dubious rea­
soning as no provision of the medicare scheme contemplates the 
depression of employee wages as essential to provider 
reimbursement. 
Restrictions on the "reasonable cost" principle have the effect of 
shifting health care costs either to patient-consumers not covered by 
federal health insurance or to medicare recipients who often would 
be unable to pay the disallowed costs. Under the principle of cost 
apportionment, providers may not receive reimbursement for costs 
153. 	 E.g., S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1965). 
154. 	 46 Fed. Reg. 3,983, 3,984 (1981). 
155. 	 Id 
156. See 42 C.F.R. § 405.451(a) (1982). Also, 42 C.F.R. § 405.45 I (c)(3) (1982) de­
clares that "[t)he reasonable cost basis of reimbursement contemplates that the providers 
of services would be reimbursed the actual costs of providing quality care however 
widely the actual costs may vary from provider to provider and from time to time for the 
same providers." Id "This is subject to a limitation where a particular institution's costs 
are found to be substantially out of line with other institutions in the same area which are 
similar in size, scope of services, utilization, and other relevant factors." Id 
§ 405.451 (c )(2). 
157. 	 Id § 405.45 I (a), (b). 
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incurred to provide health care to non-medicare beneficiaries. ISS 
Any shifting of general costs from medicare to non-medicare pa­
tients has not been, however, a consideration in developing reim­
bursement principles, although health care strategists often assume a 
free-market approach to health care. IS9 A broader, more integrated 
national health care system would require an accounting of all such 
expenses incurred through treatment of every patient, subject to di­
rection under established legislative goals. 160 
The effect of cost apportionment on the non-reimbursement of 
unionization simply is that, under the present medicare system, those 
patients who are not covered by medicare will probably bear the 
providers' cost of persuasion. Whether the lack of congressional 
concern regarding shifting health care costs to those who are non­
beneficiaries of medicare may be inferred from the enactment of sec­
tion 107 is debatable. 161 Nonetheless, the emergence of public con­
trol, through activism in Congress and the state legislatures, over all 
health care costs is a recurring theme in any recent analysis of fed­
eral health insurance issues. 162 
In general, the medicare and medicaid provisions of TEFRA, 
while designed to reduce federal expenditures,163 also indicate a con­
gressional dissatisfaction with the current administration of health 
care programs. This sentiment was translated into legislative meas­
158. See supra notes 83, 95 & 99 and accompanying text. 
159. In theory, the health care consumer's ability to make rational market choices 
to maximize utility will cause in the aggregate the optimal resource allocation of medical 
services. Realistically, this ability is nonexistent, at least with the "consumption" of hos­
pital services. As expected, the effects of medicare and medicaid-an increase in the 
public's ability to demand health care with little incentive for institutional cost contain­
ment-have "produced an inflationary impact on the cost of services." Weiner, "Reason· 
able Cost" Reimbursement for Inpatient Hospital Services under Medicare and Medicaid: 
The Emergence of Public Control, 3 AM. J.L. & MED. I, 3-4 (1977). See also FEDER, 
supra note II, at 2. 
160. Commentators have noted that the primary objectives of medicare policy im­
plementation have been to ensure provider participation; hence, the program's emphasis 
has been on the payment of claims, rather than on the development of a broad national 
health system. See, e.g., FEDER, supra note II, at 3, 143-56. 
161. As excessive federal health care costs would result in tax increases or a shift­
ing of program priorities, national policy makers, the Congress and the Executive, have 
an interest in the cost-containment issue. FEDER, supra note II, at 4. 
162. Weiner, supra note 159, at 46-47. 
163. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text. The federal expenditure for 
medicare for fiscal year 1982 is estimated to be $33.4 billion. N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1982, at 
A24, col. 6. Recently, the cost of the program has been rising steadily at an annual rate 
of approximately 15%. Id at AI, col. 6; see also REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. 
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ures proposed to contain cost increases charged by the providers. l64 
Although dependent upon federal funding, as envisioned by the 
original proponents of the medicare scheme,165 the current health 
care system mandates extensive decision-making by the regulated 
parties, the providers of health care. 166 The flexible standards of 
"reasonable cost" reimbursement l67 still allow a health care indus­
try, essential to our national welfare, to dictate through a guaranteed 
but controlled market how the health care resources are to be distrib­
uted. Control over the allocation process incorporates great weight 
in the decisions regarding the costs of health care. Cost reimburse­
ment issues, like the cost of persuasion question, indicate a congres­
sional willingness to step into the fray, perhaps to transfer control 
over health care costsl68 from the providers to the public through the 
legislative process. 169 
Congruent with further government control over health care 
costs, and in accordance with provisions of the 1982 tax act,11o for­
164. See title I of the Tax Equity & Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 
97-248, 96 Stat. 324-395. 
165. After the establishment of the medicare system, the providers' net income in­
creased substantially. Weiner, supra note 159, at 13. Typically, any excess revenue re­
ceived would be utilized for major capital expenditures, thus generating increased 
provider operating costs. Id Provider expansion, however, was compatible with the 
medicare policy objective of increasing the availability of quality health care. See supra 
notes 11-16 and accompanying text. 
166. See Weiner, supra note 159, at 1-47. 
167. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
168. In fiscal year 1981, $243 billion dollars were spent for personal health care; 
almost 40% of that figure came from public funds: federal contributions for medicare 
and medicaid, $71 billion; state and local governments' share of medicaid, $26 billion. 
HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVICES, HEALTH CARE FINANCING TRENDS VOL. 3, No. I, I June 1982. 
169. See Weiner, supra note 159, at 46-47. This reallocation of power in the pol­
icy-making process was recognized by commentators during the 1970's: 
The trend is toward the characterization of rate making as rate regulation (fo­
cusing on cost evaluation) rather than rate setting (focusing on costjinding). 
The regulated parties-the hospitals-will no longer be the principal decision­
makers. Characterized as rate regulation, the rate making process must main­
tain a careful balance of hospital and public needs, correcting the hospital­
favoring approach created by HEW's earlier implementation of the "reasonable 
cost" provisions of the 1965 Medicare and Medicaid statutes. 
Id (At the time of his article's publication, Weiner served as chair of the Massachusetts 
Rate Setting Commission.) 
170. Section 101(b)(3) of the Act provides: 
(c) The Secretary shall develop, in consultation with the Senate Committee on 
Finance and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representa­
tives, proposals for legislation which would provide that hospitals, skilled nurs­
ing facilities, and, to the extent feasible, other providers, would be reimbursed 
under title XVIII of this [Social Security) Act on a prospective basis. The Sec­
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mer HHS Secretary Schweiker proposed a new system of hospital 
reimbursement based upon "prospective financing."!7! Under this 
proposal, all hospitals would receive the same amount of reimburse­
ment, at a rate fixed in advance, for health care to any medicare 
patient with a particular diagnosis. 172 Similarly, section 107 may be 
viewed as another indication of dissatisfaction with the status quo, 
that is, the industry'S domination of the decision-making process re­
garding health care costs. 
v. CONCLUSION 
Section 107 of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 
1982 (TEFRA)!73 prohibits reimbursement from the medicare trust 
funds to health care institutions for costs incurred to resist employee 
unionization. This congressional enactment ended a three year pol­
icy struggle over the issue of when medicare reimbursement should 
be allowed for provider costs regarding labor relations matters. In 
accordance with section 107, employer expenses for activities 
designed to persuade workers not to join or form a union are not 
allowable costs. Reasonable health care provider expenses for col­
lective bargaining negotiations or employee contract implementa­
tion, however, are deemed to be related to patient care and are 
reimbursable costs under the medicare law. The federal govern­
ment's neutral posture in labor-management affairs is advanced fur­
ther by section 107, although reimbursement of certain provider 
collective bargaining negotiation expenses will still provide health 
care employers with a decided advantage at the negotiating table. 
As an example of legislative activism in the area of medical 
costs, section 107 contains a substantive policy-laden message be­
yond the issue of health care cost containment: Anti-union activities 
should not be federally funded through social welfare programs. 
retary shall report such proposals to such committees not later than December 
31, 1982. 
Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 101(b)(3), 96 Stat. 335 (1982). 
171. N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1982 at AI, col. 6. 
172. Id According to Secretary Schweiker, prospective financing proposals would 
diminish the beneficiaries' costs for "deductibles." Id at A24, col. 5. Prospective financ­
ing theory holds that providers would be forced to economize in order to maximize prof­
its or to be within the operating budget of the institution. Efficient delivery of health care 
below reimbursement rates would result in greater cash flow for the provider, while ac­
tual costs above the rate would create a loss to the institution. Realistically, the excess 
costs in the latter situation would be borne by the consumer-patient, possibly in the form 
of lower quality care. 
173. 96 Stat. 337, § 107 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(I)(N». 
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Nonetheless, along with measures like the congressional mandate for 
prospective cost allowances, section 107 represents a continuing 
trend of closer congressional scrutiny of the rapidly increasing cost 
of health care. The persuasion costs involved in the policy debate 
terminated by passage of section 107 were minute in comparison to 
overall federal health care expenditures. Yet, congressional response 
to public outcry against a policy of anti-unionization cost reimburse­
ment indicates a propensity by Congress to shift control of at least 
some policy decisions regarding health care costs to the public via 
the legislative process. Absent an overall program akin to a univer­
sal comprehensive national health insurance that would reform the 
current method of reimbursing health care providers, public input 
into the health care process is preferable to provider domination of 
the decision-making process within the medicare system. 
While the original purpose of medicare was to encourage health 
care providers' participation in a program that would guarantee ade­
quate medical services to our nation's elderly and disabled,174 medi­
care beneficiaries are now integral to the ability of hospitals and 
nursing facilities to sustain profits or even maintain operating ex­
penses. 175 Payments for their care from the trust funds are an impor­
tant part of the providers' income stream. 176 Therefore, government 
denial of reimbursement costs for hospitals' anti-unionization activi­
ties will not cause a mass exodus of providers from the medicare or 
medicaid programs. Similarly, the quality of services should remain 
unaffected by nonallowance of these types of expenditures. Because 
medicare increased a demand for health services in the United 
States,177 federal health programs have been singled out as a prime 
cause of the escalation of medical care costS.178 In light of the con­
cern for health care cost containment, the legislated policy of deny­
ing medicare reimbursement for counter-unionization activities is in 
the overall national interest. 
Burl Cohen 
174. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text. 
175. See supra notes 165 & 168. 
176. See supra note 163. 
177. E.g., Weiner, supra note 159, at 3-4. 
178. Id 
